Tag Archives: Ukraine

Is Russia Losing Control over the Ukrainian Separatists?

This is a guest post by Milos Popovic, a PhD student at the International Relations and European Studies Department at Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. 

A recent post by a Russian-backed separatist leader Igor Girkin claiming credit for shooting down the Malaysian airline MH17 had circulated the Internet before it was removed. The separatists now deny their involvement arguing that they don’t have the capabilities to shoot down a plane at 10,000 meters (reportedly, the altitude of MH17). The evidence suggests that the plane was hit by the surface-to-air BUK missile system, which can launch missiles up to an altitude of 22,000 meters. Both the Russian and Ukrainian military have this hardware, but the two countries adamantly reject their involvement. Allegedly, a group of AP journalists have encountered a launcher similar to the BUK system near the town of Snizhne, which is under the rebel control. While Russia doesn’t deny its military support to the separatists, it denies the delivery of the BUK to its client. If it turns out that the Ukrainian rebels carried out the attack against Moscow’s directions, it will be a major source of embarrassment for Russia, their main supporter.

However, it won’t be the first time that a proxy embarrassed its sponsor. For instance, the Palestinian leftist groups have abducted foreign tourists in the late 1960s against the interests of their Arab sponsors. The Abu Nidal Organization embarrassed Syria when it claimed the responsibility for IRA’s assassination attempt against the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. During the Yugoslav wars, the Bosnian Serb leadership outraged their sponsor, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, when they refused to accept the Vance-Owen Plan. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers first refused a peace agreement brokered by their sponsor India, and then turn their guns against the Indian peacekeeping corps.

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Deterrence & the Inigo Montoya Problem: I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means

Inigo Montoya MemeInigo Montoya famously said, “You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.” Journalists seem especially prone to the Inigo Montoya problem, especially when it comes to basic ideas in international relations.

David Sanger had an article in yesterday’s Sunday NYT op-ed section titled “Deterrence Revisited“. In it he argues (borrowing from a White House official) that President Obama is trying to find “a middle ground between the isolation strain that has emerged and the overextension of the past decade”. This has become a common, well-worn trope: present two “extreme” points of view (“isolationism” poorly-defined on the one hand and whatever it was that George W. did on the other) and then present something vaguely in the middle as the “reasonable” center. Nixon’s aphorism that we’re all Keynesians may or may not be true, but we sure are all Hegelians. Continue reading

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The Helsinki Accords, “Normal” International Relations, and Our Terrible Historical Memory

The conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s actions in Crimea continue to dominate headlines and capture international attention. It’s been a while since we’ve seen irredentism as a relevant concept, but hostile boundary-shifting has again become de rigueur.

This has shocked a lot of people, not least many journalists, who tend to have some of the shortest historical memories on the planet. What Russia has done in Crimea, and appears possibly poised to do in eastern Ukraine – annex territory though the use or threats of force – seems so, well, 19th century. I mean, people just don’t do that sort of thing anymore, do they?

In fact, the standards of international behavior that we have come to expect – in particular, the rule that we don’t change boundaries by invading and annexing chunks of land – has a relatively recent provenance. Moreover, there was never anything inevitable about it. We didn’t arrive at the “no hostile takeover” rule by some process of inevitable progress towards a more civilized world. This means that any such rule can evaporate as quickly as it came.

As my friend & co-author Steve Saideman has recently pointed out, the “don’t change boundaries with force” rule in Europe actually dates back to the Helsinki Accords, which were signed only in 1975. This in itself was a signal accomplishment – Europe was divided into two armed camps at the height of the Cold War, and getting NATO and the Warsaw Pact to agree on fundamental rules was both remarkable and strongly stabilizing for Europe. Although other agreements (SALT, START, INF) tend to get more attention, the Helsinki Accords may be the greatest achievement in the effort to stabilize the Cold War conflict and prevent World War III.

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Eastern Ukraine: Irredentism Isn’t What We Think It Is

I’ve read several interesting and insightful things about Eastern Ukraine recently. The first was posted a while back by Will Moore, who asked “Is Crimea’s Ethnic Conflict Banal?” Picking up on work by John Mueller on Bosnia back in the 1990s Moore points out the likelihood that, far from being a “popular uprising,” it is likely that the armed takeovers of Crimean (and now, eastern Ukrainian) buildings by various “local” groups were largely done by gangs of thugs who could be easily mobilized because they like exercising power and threatening (or using) violence on others. I found this argument persuasive back in the 1990s when Mueller first proposed it, and I think that Moore’s application of it Ukraine is spot-on. It certainly fits the broader picture that seems to be emerging, which is one of Russian interference through intermediaries – who now seem to be rather well-armed for a “citizen militia”.

The second piece was a well-considered article posted recently to Political Violence @ a Glance by Brantislav Slantchev. In it he puts together a key argument about Russia’s motives in Ukraine:

As I have argued here and here, Putin’s regime is by now almost entirely legitimized by the idea of recovering Russia’s rightful place in the sun. His policies have explicitly aimed at overcoming what I call the Cold War Syndrome – the purported illness that has afflicted Russia after the demise of the Soviet Union and that is to blame for all its current troubles at home and abroad. Briefly, with the disappearance of the military might of the USSR, Russia has been unable to resist the victorious West which has relentlessly advanced everywhere, pushing a new Iron Curtain ever closer to the Russian borders. The expansions of NATO and the EU, the increasing commercial and cultural penetration around the globe, globalization itself, all of this has marginalized Russia, depriving it of influence and forcing it into the humiliating role akin to that of former colonies of the West: exporter of raw materials to fund Western consumerism. Russia can only prosper if it counters these tendencies and establishes a zone of influence in Eurasia. It must halt the inexorable advance of the West, which has moved the Iron Curtain east, and this can only be done if it recovers its military posture.

His take-away from this argument is that sanctions are unlikely to reverse Russian behavior, and may even make matters worse. That’s an important conclusion in itself, but Slantchev’s argument struck me also for what it says about the likely future course of the conflict in Ukraine.

If Slantchev is right, then either destabilizing or dismembering Ukraine is central to Putin’s domestic political legitimacy. Crimea was low-hanging fruit, but if Putin is trying to make the argument that Russia is returning to its “proper place” in the world then dominating Ukraine is a necessary step in such an argument – far more so than influencing the Stans or even beating up on small former Soviet republics like Georgia. If this is true, then there is a serious motivation gap here: Russia may care about the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine far more than either the US or Europe (many Americans can’t even fine Ukraine on a map). That kind of motivational edge can be a powerful advantage.

What strikes me most about all of this is what it says about irredentism and our popular notions about ethnic conflict. I myself tend to be pretty sympathetic to ethnic separatism and irredentism, if only because I think that people ought to be governed by those they want to be governed by. But what we see playing out in eastern Ukraine today isn’t about ethnic self-determination. Irredentism it may be, but irredentism as a tool in the service of elite power

Continued interference from Russia suggests that the conflict is about Russia’s domestic politics, not the rights of various Ukrainian groups – and it is extremely unlikely that Putin is motivated by any coherent sense of “Russian nationalism” beyond wanting to bolster the strength of his own regime. The escalating violence on the ground, being driven to a large degree by self-appointed armed gangs, demonstrates that even if there are forces internal to Ukraine driving some of this they are not interested in what “the people” want. Any additional “elections” or “referenda” conducted from here on out will be about as legitimate as elections under the old Soviet Union, or perhaps a bit like some labor union “elections” is the bad old days – vote the “right way” or be subject to severe sanctions.

Ultimately what we’re seeing in Ukraine is a slow-motion breakdown of political processes in favor of brute force. Russia, through threats and proxies, has indicated how it wants things to go and has signaled its willingness to use whatever means necessary to get the outcomes it likes – whether that involved annexing additional chunks of Ukraine, replacing the government in Kiev, or simply creating a long-running conflict that cripples the Ukrainian state. This may play very well in Russian domestic politics, as it looks like Russia is “regaining its strength”. To the rest of the world, it simply signals a Russian government that – like its proxies in Donetsk and elsewhere – behaves thugishly and with no respect for the rule of law. It’s good domestic politics and lousy foreign policy – just what we have come to expect in that part of the world.

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Russian Foreign Policy Interests in Ukraine

This is a guest post by Zachary SeldenAssistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida and former Deputy Secretary General for Policy at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

There is a lot of commentary out there on Ukraine right now, but there is not a lot being said about Russian foreign policy interests.  From 2003-2011, I spend a lot of time in the NATO world dealing with Russian diplomats and politicians.  I remember sitting across the table from Deputy PM Dimitry Rogozin back when he was the Russian ambassador to NATO.  I remember all too many meetings with Russian Duma members where they played out conspiracy theories that would make a 9-11 Truthers meeting look thoughtful and balanced.  I’m no Russia expert, but I think I have some insight.

First, what do they really want?  Its pretty simple: Russia wants to politically and economically control the “near abroad” and weaken any potential competitor for influence in the region.   No secret there. Against that scorecard, they are doing well at the moment.  Even if Russia does nothing more in Ukraine’s east, they have effectively blocked Ukraine from closer association with the EU and NATO.  Why?  Because neither NATO nor the EU is going to take in a state with territorial disputes.  If you want to make an EU official break out in hives, just whisper “Cyprus” in his ear and watch the itching begin.  Russia’s actions in Georgia effectively block them from joining NATO, so the strategy  works.   Russia now effectively holds a trump card over any western-oriented Ukrainian government that wants to move closer toward western institutions.

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